The program for the day can be downloaded as a PDF here.
- 0830-0835: Welcome and Overview
- 0835-1035 – Session 1: Voting Theory
- Luis Sánchez Fernández, Norberto Fernandez Garcia, Jesus Arias Fisteus and Pablo Basanta-Val – Some Notes on Justified Representation
- Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra – Modeling Single-Peakedness for Votes with Ties
- Marina Bannikova, Lihi Naamani-Dery, Svetlana Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein – Between Fairness and a Mistrial: Consensus Under a Deadline
- Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein – Non-Myopic Voting Dynamics: An Optimistic Approach
- 1035-1100 – Coffee Break
- 1100-1230 – Session 2: More About Preferences
- Julia Theresa Csar, Martin Lackner, Reinhard Pichler and Emanuel Sallinger – Winner Determination in Huge Elections with Mapreduce
- Marc Serramia, Maite Lopez-Sanchez and Juan Antonio Rodriguez Aguilar – Aggregation Operators to Compute Norm Support in Virtual Communities
- Atena Mtabakhi, Ferdinando Fioretto and William Yeoh – A Preliminary Study on Preference Elicitation in DCOPs for Scheduling Devices in Smart Buildings
- 1230-1330 – Lunch
- 1330-1430 – Invited Talk: Vincent Conitzer – Mechanism Design in Data-Rich Environments
- Abstract: In the standard model of mechanism design, agents have privately held information — usually consisting of just their preferences — and the challenge is that they will report whatever information to the mechanism they feel is in their best interest. However, this model does not always fit modern environments. For one, the mechanism may obtain a lot of data about the agent, and while the agent may be able to limit or change the data that the mechanism obtains, doing so may require nontrivial, costly effort. On the other hand, the mechanism may not have a good handle on the agents’ identities, for example because an agent participates under multiple accounts. I will discuss our recent work on these topics.
No prior background in mechanism design is required. The talk is primarily focused on joint work with Andrew Kephart, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, and Nisarg Shah.
- Bio: Vincent Conitzer is the Kimberly J. Jenkins University Professor of New Technologies and Professor of Computer Science, Professor of Economics, and Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. He received Ph.D. (2006) and M.S. (2003) degrees in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and an A.B. (2001) degree in Applied Mathematics from Harvard University. Most of his research is on artificial intelligence (especially multiagent systems) and economic theory (especially game theory, social choice, and mechanism design). Conitzer has received the Social Choice and Welfare Prize (2014), a Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award, an NSF CAREER award, the inaugural Victor Lesser dissertation award, an honorable mention for the ACM dissertation award, and several awards for papers and service at the AAAI and AAMAS conferences. He has also been named a Guggenheim Fellow, a Kavli Fellow, a Bass Fellow, a Sloan Fellow, and one of AI’s Ten to Watch. Conitzer and Preston McAfee are the founding Editors-in-Chief of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC).
- Abstract: In the standard model of mechanism design, agents have privately held information — usually consisting of just their preferences — and the challenge is that they will report whatever information to the mechanism they feel is in their best interest. However, this model does not always fit modern environments. For one, the mechanism may obtain a lot of data about the agent, and while the agent may be able to limit or change the data that the mechanism obtains, doing so may require nontrivial, costly effort. On the other hand, the mechanism may not have a good handle on the agents’ identities, for example because an agent participates under multiple accounts. I will discuss our recent work on these topics.
- 1430-1530: Session 3: Preference Networks
- Malek Mouhoub, Samira Sadaoui and Shu Zhang – Constrained TCP-nets
- Zachary J. Oster – Efficient Satisfiability Verification for Conditional Importance Networks
- 1530-1600 – Coffee Break
- 1600-1700 – Session 4: Even More Preferences
- Batya Kenig and Benny Kimelfeld – A Probabilistic Graphical Model for Mallows Preferences
- Francesca Rossi – Moral Preferences
- 1700-1730 – Discussion and Closing Remarks